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“Siamo qua in cerca d’un autore! 
D’un autore? Che autore?  
D’uno qualunque, signore.1  
 
L. PIRANDELLO 
 
 
1. Introduction: new actors on a new stage 
It is commonplace to assert that the crisis that started in 2007 has changed the world financial and 
economic stage in a fundamental way. Less obvious is to explain how and why. A key novelty is the 
increased interconnection among phenomena previously deemed unrelated. This interconnection 
predates the crisis, but before 2007 few were aware of its true extent. It has several dimensions. 
Spatial interconnection, first of all: the ability of asset markets to transmit shocks across space was 
known, but few anticipated, only three years ago, that financial integration was so advanced that a 
crisis in the US would automatically lead to a crisis in Europe in a matter of days. Market 
interconnection, second: once the financial turmoil hit, it spared nobody: banks, other 
intermediaries, corporates, households, real estate, stocks, eventually governments and their debt. 
And in the end, unavoidably, policy interconnection: in a crisis so extensive and devastating all 
instruments of economic policy (monetary, banking and financial, fiscal in all its ramifications) are 
called into action, often together, to rescue and to repair. The faith in a pre-arranged and rigid 
assignment of policy instruments to specific goals is an intellectual casualty of this crisis.  
Another key aspect of the picture is the birth, or move to centre-stage, of new actors on the world 
economic scene. National actors, most evidently: the main emerging countries, previously invited – 
when lucky – to sit in a dinner or speak at a seminar at the margin of a G7, since 2008 have become 
equal partners in the global economic decision making process. More than that: they have played, as 
we shall discuss, a fundamental role in providing much needed support to the global economy during 
the 2009 recession. The simple fact that a contribution of the emerging countries to solving the crisis 
in the euro area has been discussed, as indeed happened 2011, is indicative of the magnitude of the 
change. But, in addition to national actors, we are now witnessing the rise of a whole new class of 
institutional actors. The financial architecture reform underway has produced a new family of 
financial market regulators or empowered existing ones. The Financial Stability Forum has changed 
name and grown in size and scope. Systemic risk councils have been created on both sides of the 
                                                 
1 'We are here in search of an author! An author? Which author? Whoever, sir'. Quote from Luigi Pirandello’s play Sei 
personaggi in cerca d’autore, 1921. 
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Atlantic. In Europe, supervisory and regulatory coordination, recently a vision of few farsighted2, is 
now largely achieved through the creation of three new supranational agencies, respectively 
supervising banking, markets and institutional investors. And the list could continue. 
Among the institutional actors, a most prominent one, with the ambition of playing the protagonist 
role, is the new G20. 'New' because a G20 already existed since 1999, but at a ministerial level and 
with much lower visibility and responsibility. In the days following the fall of Lehman Brothers 
(September 2008), when global finance seemed about to melt down, the political leaders reacted 
with a new imaginative idea, to convene a meeting of G20 leaders to find a common response to the 
present danger and to send a reassuring message to the financial markets and the public opinions. It 
was not obvious that a financial crisis originated and confined in the advanced countries should be 
approached by strengthening a grouping like the G20. yet the idea worked, and contributed 
positively to the restoration of calm and initiating, through successive meetings in Washington, 
London, Pittsburgh, Toronto, Seoul and Cannes, a phase of effective policy coordination in several 
key areas, including notably financial market reform, macroeconomic policies, and IMF governance.  
The overall performance of the G20 over time is the object of dispute. After considerable initial 
excitement, hope and success, leaders and international bodies got tangled in complex details. 
Negotiations slowed, progress became less visible, disagreement resurfaced, and outside criticism 
increased. Some ask if the G20 is already passé. 
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to revisit the basic economic and geo-political 
motivations for the G20, to review its performance and attempt to draw, from the two, lessons for the 
way ahead. 
We start in section 2 with a discussion on the rationale for the G20 in its current format. We then 
review in section 3 its short history, outlining what have been the ambitions and the achievements of 
the successive presidencies. In section 4 we move to providing assessment, partly judgemental and 
partly by using more systematic indicators available in the literature. Section 5 is devoted to 
governance and the reforms that could help make the G20 more effective and efficient. Section 6 
concludes.     
In short, our main conclusions are the following: (1) in today’s global economy (with its trade and 
financial market integration and its institutional architecture) a 'G20-type' institution is necessary – 
if it didn’t exist, it should be created; (2) the G20 had its high noon moment in 2008-09 and some 
recalibration of expectations was inevitable, but its achievements in 2010-11 have been 
                                                 
2 We pay tribute here to the late Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, who in 2007 proposed to the Ecofin, receiving almost no 
support, changes in Europe’s financial regulation that were very similar to those eventually enacted. 
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nevertheless disappointing; (3) to be fair there is, in detailed and technical work, more progress than 
appears at first sight; (4) from a governance standpoint, the G20 is not an efficient forum; 
improvements to its working methods are urgently needed; (5) more fundamentally, for the G20 to 
retain its role, its members need to develop a common vision of global economic problems and the 
way to approach them.  
2. Do we need a G20 at all?  
Is there a need for economic coordination in today’s global economy? Can policy decisions be 
improved by a collective consultation process, similar to that taking place in the G20, or should such 
decisions be taken by national authorities acting in isolation and based primarily on domestic 
conditions? Even if coordination is needed, should it involve emerging as well as advanced 
economies?  These are the question we are looking at in this section. The focus is not on whether 
coordination has worked in practice (we will examine the performance issue next), but on whether it 
can serve a useful purpose as a matter of principle. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the 
debate can move on to examine how this function can be performed, and by whom. 
The question is neither rhetorical nor new. For long time, for example under the classical gold 
standard (nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), national monetary policies followed by and 
large stable rules, shaped by incentives and constraints dictated by the working of the international 
monetary system (Keynes’ famous 'rules of the game')3. The inherent constraints on the conduct of 
monetary policy implicitly provided policy discipline in other domains as well. Nevertheless, no 
explicit, discretionary coordination mechanism existed at the time. Rules made national policy 
decisions relatively simple and predictable. As discussed below in more detail, this lesson from 
history – namely, that not all successful international economic policy arrangements necessarily 
rely on coordination – received considerable backing from economic analysis. Theory and evidence 
in the recent decades have tended to support the view that, under plausible circumstances 
concerning the working of the international economy, the most efficient and effective arrangement 
for policymaking corresponds to each country acting in isolation, pursuing national objectives.  
While acknowledging that these views carry weight, and that the issue is far from settled, we take a 
different view here. The point we make in this section is that the world economy has evolved, in 
recent years, in a way that makes the benefits from policy coordination at G20 level more likely and 
more substantial. The same developments have made the analytical results in the economic 
literature, generally denying the existence of significant benefits from coordination, less relevant. 
                                                 
3 See McKinnon (1993). The relevance of the concept of rules of the game was challenged in the well known essay by 
Triffin (1985).  
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We will proceed in three steps, first examining links between coordination and developments in the 
international monetary system in the post-war period; second by revisiting and putting in context 
the arguments and evidence produced by the economic literature on the gains from coordination; 
third by evaluating the degree of integration between advanced and emerging economies.  
2.1 – Monetary arrangements and international coordination since WW2 
The world monetary order established after WW2 was centred on the hegemonic position of one 
country, the US, and it currency, the dollar. The US acted as the main source of global demand and of 
global liquidity, with all other industrialised countries (mainly, Europe) linked to the dominant 
country and to it currency by a set of rules, amounting to what was called the 'gold exchange 
standard' (Angeloni et al, 2011). Europe’s post-war reconstruction and development needs required 
an expansion of international demand, which was initially provided by the move of the US into current 
account deficit, and a constant expansion of international reserves, which took place through a 
persistence of the US financial account deficits, the accumulation of dollar balances in the books of 
the other countries’ central banks, and ultimately a gradual transfer of US gold reserves to the rest of 
the world. 
As well known, the system worked acceptably for many years but in the end was undermined by its 
own success (the 'Triffin dilemma'). Eventually, the continuous and growing US deficit brought the 
system to reach the limit of the US availability of gold reserves. What matters more for our purpose, 
however, is that the system designed at Bretton Woods was built on rules that produced an 
automatic self-rebalancing mechanism for all countries except the US. For this reason it did not 
require explicit coordination mechanisms. With the important exception of the US, the emergence of 
an excessive external imbalances in any country was automatically cured by the constraint of the 
availability of dollar reserves (and indirectly, gold) triggering macroeconomic adjustment, either by 
market forces (deflation), or domestic policies or, in occasional circumstances, via exchange rate 
adjustments. 
The breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the subsequent move to floating exchange rates in 
1973 changed this situation radically. First and foremost, the possibility of exchange rate floating 
removed the constraint on domestic policymaking arising from the need for foreign exchange 
reserves. Some countries adopted other forms of domestic monetary anchors – most notably, 
Germany introduced monetary targets in the mid-1970s. Other European countries continued to peg 
their exchange rate, adhering first to the 'snake' and later, in 1979 and following years, to the 
European Monetary System (a fixed exchange-rate system among European countries that 
mimicked the Bretton Woods system on a regional scale). Most developing economies initially 
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remained on some sort of peg or managed exchange rate system (Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2008).   
The demise of the Bretton Woods regime and the first oil shock in 1973-74 triggered a new wave of 
cooperation arrangements. The first important decision was taken in 1975 when the G5 (which 
would soon become the G7) was created by initiative of the French President Giscard d’Estaing. As 
recovery from this shock disappointed, the G7 soon embarked on a coordinated stimulus exercise on 
the occasion of the 1978 Bonn summit. The attempt ended in a failure after the second oil shock in 
1979 called for a reversal of priorities in favour of fighting inflation and it remained in the 
policymakers’ memory as an illustration of the risks of coordination. In the eyes of many 
policymakers, joint action had led to embark on a wrong course and to fight a demand shock while 
the world economy had been suffering from a supply shock. Especially, German policymakers 
resented to have bowed to US pressure, which led the country to be caught in a difficult position 
when the second oil shock hit. There would be no further meaningful attempt at coordinated stimulus 
until the 2008 crisis.  
In the mid-1980s, following the rise and fall of the US dollar exchange rate, the G7 embarked on an 
attempt at monitoring exchange rates. The Plaza accord of 1985 and the Louvre accord of 1987 
resulted in the setting of soft target zones for exchange rates between the dollar, the deutsche mark 
and the yen. These guideposts would remain more or less in place until the first half of the 1990s, 
after which they were de facto abandoned. But again, it was felt afterwards in the policy community 
that coordination on exchange rates had gone too far (from the mere avoidance of blatant 
misalignments to the near-fixing of real exchange rates) and again, it left one country unhappy. In 
that case it was Japan whose monetary policy had been geared towards external objectives instead 
of addressing the build-up of the housing and stock-market bubble4.       
Apart from these two significant attempts, the G7 in the reminder of its 35-years existence refrained 
from attempting at effective coordination and limited its ambition to setting broad objectives. At 
finance minister level, it was also instrumental in setting directions for multilateral responses to 
developing-countries crises, serving as a de facto steering committee for the IMF.    
The emergence of the G20 was initially a response to the recurrence of crises in emerging countries. 
Its creation at ministerial level was triggered by the Asian crisis of 1997-98, and in its first ten years 
of existence it served as a consultation forum and did not attempt at effective policy coordination.  
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 led to its upgrading to head of state and government level and, 
                                                 
4 Shirakawa (2011). 
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in 2009, to its elevation to the status of main forum of global economic coordination, overtaking the 
G7/G8. 
2.2 – Gains from coordination: the academic literature revisited 
Policy developments in the 1970s and the 1980s triggered research on the benefits and costs of 
macroeconomic policy coordination. Research in this area, both theoretical and empirical, was very 
active in the 1980s and then again in the last 10 years. The two strands of literature were very 
different in method and emphasis, but converged, for different reasons, to a common conclusion: 
that the benefits of policy coordination are likely to be too small to balance the costs of negotiating 
policies among independent governments. 
In many respects, the benchmark view was put forth by Milton Friedman (1953). According to 
Friedman, flexible exchange rates have the property of insulating the national economy from 
domestic and foreign shocks, deriving from technological or market factors as well as from policies. 
By 'flexible', Friedman and his followers meant floating, that is, as clearly explained by Harry Johnson 
(1969) “foreign exchange rates that are determined daily in the market for foreign exchanges, by the 
forces of demand and supply without restrictions imposed by governmental policy on the extent to 
which they can move”. If the insulation property is in fact fulfilled, cross-border effects stemming 
from policies or other economic shocks disappear and national policymakers can concentrate on 
conducting optimal policies based on domestic objectives alone. International coordination 
becomes, by definition, pointless. 
Does the exchange regime influence real macroeconomic performance? Baxter and Stockman 
(1989) examined the statistical properties of the main macro variables of a large sample of 
industrialised countries, before and after the end of the Bretton Woods regime. They concluded that, 
though the macro performance (measured by volatility and correlation of the main macro indicators) 
changed in a number of respects across the two periods, this was not related to the exchange 
regime. This evidence has traditionally been considered as supportive of Friedman’s view, based on 
the reasoning that, if no gain in terms of macroeconomic performance can be achieved by fixing or 
pegging exchange rates, it may be better to opt for flexible rates. a simpler solution that also 
increases the degrees of freedom for policymakers and allows to choose and pursue country specific 
objectives. In fact, however, the same evidence could be read differently: if macroeconomic volatility 
is not altered by the exchange regime, the insulating property of floating rates is unlikely to hold, at 
least in the strict sense advocated by Friedman. 
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Floating exchange rates furthermore do not make coordination irrelevant. Models with strategic 
interactions among policymakers à la Hamada (1974, 1979), Canzoneri and Gray (1985) and others 
showed that monetary policy could be used strategically, with the result that the uncoordinated 
outcome was Pareto-inferior. This finding provided an argument for coordination, but the question 
was how significant it was empirically.   
In the 1970s and 1980s, many approached the issue of the gains from coordination using macro-
econometric models, with blocks of countries linked by international trade. Capital flows were absent 
or passive, reflecting the reality of the times. As a consequence, the international spillovers 
incorporated in these models depended on trade integration – typically limited at the time, but 
rising. Following Oudiz and Sachs (1984), many attempted to provide empirical estimates of the 
gains from coordination. The central message of this literature, reviewed by Canzoneri and 
Henderson (1990), was mixed: on the one hand, there was clearly a role for coordination, generated 
by the fact that domestic policy choices did have cross-border effects – in particular, beggar-thy-
neighbour policies were possible by manipulating the exchange rate. On the other, these effects were 
quantitatively small, and so were the potential gains from coordination. Frankel and Rockett (1988) 
added another argument based on imperfect information: even though there would be gains in a full-
information context, uncertainty over the true structure of the economy made them elusive at best.  
In short, the literature of the 1970s and the 1980s did not deny the possibility of coordination gains, 
but it claimed that there were too small and uncertain to be pursued by policymakers. The key issue 
was an empirical one: the problem is correctly measuring the importance and implications of cross-
border interconnections stemming from trade and potentially from capital flows, using realistic 
models. 
The subsequent literature, however, abandoned this line and took a markedly different route. A new 
generation of open-economy macroeconomic models appeared after the turn of the millennium 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001; Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001; Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2002; Canzoneri, 
Cumby and Diba, 2002), which differed from the earlier ones in two respects. First, they possessed 
explicit (but highly stylised) microeconomic foundations, which allowed, with assumptions about 
individual preferences, to directly measure the effects of policy coordination on the welfare of 
economic agents. Second, they featured price rigidity and monopolistic competition on the supply 
side. These market imperfections made competitive equilibria suboptimal and opened the way to a 
role for macroeconomic policy in removing or alleviating the distortions. In the logic of these models, 
gains from coordination arise if policymakers can correct the market distortions better by 
coordinating than by acting in isolation focusing on domestic objectives alone. Moreover, further 
gains can be achieved if international financial markets are imperfect – for example, if securities 
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cannot be freely traded across borders – so that by coordinating policymakers manage to achieve a 
higher degree of risk sharing (Bergin, 2008). 
Two additional assumptions of these models are however worth emphasising, because they almost 
automatically exclude sizeable gains from international coordination. First, individual preferences 
are (at least nearly) logarithmic and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
consumption is (at least approximately) unitary. This implies that changes in the terms of trade do 
not significantly affect the external balance. The current account remains close to equilibrium 
regardless of any shocks, the output gap essentially coincides with that prevailing in a close 
economy, and hence, not surprisingly, inward oriented monetary policy turns out to be optimal. 
Second, these models typically do not contain sources of persistence, such as capital accumulation 
or debt build-up. This rules out persistent disequilibria in the balance of payments as well. Note that 
these properties of the 'new generation' open economy models do not depend on the degree of 
international openness; even if trade or capital market integration increases, as it has in recent 
years, under the restrictive assumptions just described international spillovers and gains from 
coordination would be automatically excluded. 
The new open-economy macroeconomic literature of the 1990s and the 2000s reinforced the 
conclusions from the earlier research that coordination could in principle help improve upon the Nash 
equilibrium but that gains were unlikely to be significant enough to justify incurring the cost of 
coordinating national policies. They reinforced them because they made them independent of the 
external openness of the countries concerned. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) put it, “lack of 
coordination may not always be a big problem, even in a world with significant economic integration”, 
adding that “continued improvements of monetary policy institutions at the domestic level, coupled 
with the further broadening of world capital markets, may render [partial coordination] schemes 
superfluous or even counterproductive”. 
The insights from this literature are important, as they indicated that the standard policy-
optimisation argument for coordination is likely to carry less empirical weight than initially thought.  
However, even without subscribing in full to Goodhart’s dismissive judgement on the usefulness of 
these models for policy purposes5, one must admit that they offer little guidance to address the 
problems faced recent years. Neither the open-economy models à la Mundell-Fleming of the 1980s 
nor those, à la Obstfeld-Rogoff, that were developed in the 1990s, offer much insight into the type 
and extent of interdependence observed in recent years and documented in the IMF Spillover 
                                                 
5 “There is simply nothing in these models that is of the slightest interest to a central banker”. This quote is reported by 
White (2010). 
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Reports (2011a, 2011b)6. Empirical research on the spillover effects of national developments and 
policies, as undertaken by the Fund, highlights that interdependence through traditional channels 
can be dwarfed by that arising from gross holdings of financial assets and the bellwether role of US 
capital markets. Except for countries like Canada, Mexico, China and Saudi Arabia, for which the US is 
primarily an export market, asset price links are significantly more important than traditional links 
and taking them into account typically multiplies the spillover effects of US shocks by a factor 
comprised between two and five, or even more. Furthermore these linkages are asymmetric as US 
developments affect the rest of the world much more than vice-versa.  These phenomena, which 
constitute the bread and butter of policy discussions at global level, are often assumed away in 
standard models. 
1.3 Coordination with whom?  
Whereas the creation of the G20 occurred on a particularly dramatic occasion, it had been in the 
making for several years. From about 2000 onwards, it became clearer that the G7 was not the 
appropriate venue anymore to address the major issues for the world economy. The leaders from 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa were invited to ‘have coffee’ with the G7 leaders on the 
occasion of the G8 summit in Heiligendamm in 2007. Absent the global crisis, the process of 
enlargement would probably have taken place anyway, although in a more gradual way.  
The reason for this evolution can easily be illustrated with a few graphs. To start with, growth in the 
emerging and developing countries accelerated markedly in the 1990s, implying that their share in 
the world economy (at PPP exchange rates) increased from 31 percent in 1990 to 48 percent in 
2009 (Figure 1).   
Figure 1: GDP per capita in the advanced and emerging economies, 1970-2009 
  
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank), authors’ calculations.  
                                                 
6 There are exceptions, for example by Faia (2007). 
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Second, the participation of these countries in world trade also increased dramatically (Figure 2). 
Whereas until the 1990s the bulk of world trade consisted in exchanges of goods and services 
between advanced countries, its pattern underwent major changes in the last two decades. As a 
consequence the de facto structure for trade negotiation was significantly transformed: with the 
launch of the Doha round the traditional ‘Quad’ consisting of the US, the EU, Japan and Canada – all 
G7 members – was replaced by for agricultural negotiations by a new informal grouping, the ‘FIPs’ 
(Five Interested Parties) of the US, the EU, Australia, Brazil, and India. This change is widely regarded 
as irreversible as it is in line with the change in the structure of world trade.  
Figure 2: Trade to GDP ratios, 1970-2009  
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank), authors’ calculations. Trade is equal to sum of exports and 
imports.  
The situation is less clear-cut for finance. While financial account liberalisation was completed in the 
early 1990s in advanced countries, it is far from being complete in most emerging countries. As a 
consequence financial opening measured by the ratio of assets and liabilities to GDP exceeds 400 
per cent in the advanced countries against 100 per cent in the emerging and developing countries 
(Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Assets and Liabilities as a percentage of GDP, 1970-2009 
 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009), IMF, authors’ calculations.  
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As a consequence, the emerging countries are much less integrated in the networks of global 
finance. Recent research by Kubelec and Sá (2010) provides data on bilateral financial claims that 
make possible to draw both a map of global trade integration and a map of global financial 
integration (Figures 4a and 4b).  
The graph for trade highlights the key role of China alongside the traditional trade powers and its 
strong interconnection to both all major markets and significant prediction networks in East Asia. It 
also shows that key emerging countries such as Korea and Mexico (and to a lesser extent Brazil and 
India) have become significant parts of the world trade web.   
The graph for finance highlights the pivotal role of five world hubs, the US, the UK, Germany, France 
and Japan – all G7 members – which are both tightly interconnected and connected with all or most 
other important centres. Interestingly, however, the same data also indicate the emergence of 
financial centres in emerging countries: mainland China, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore in East 
Asia; India in South Asia; and Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in Latin America. Interestingly, 14 of the 18 
nodes represented on the graph are G20 members, one (Spain) is a permanent guest, one (Hong 
Kong) is represented through China and one (Singapore) was a guest to the Cannes summit.  
Figure 4a: International trade networks, 2005
 
Source: Kubelec and Sa (2010). Links are given by the sum of bilateral exports and imports divided by the sum 
of the GDPs of the source and host countries. The size of the nodes is proportional to the country’s trade 
openness, measured by the sum of its total exports and imports. 
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Figure 4b: International financial networks, 2005 
 
Source: Kubelec and Sa (2010). Links are given by the sum of bilateral assets and liabilities divided by the sum 
of the GDPs of the source and host countries. The size of the nodes is proportional to the country’s financial 
openness, measured by the sum of its total external assets and liabilities. 
 
Clearly, there is a gap between the degree of economic integration between advanced and emerging 
economies and their degree of financial integration. Data on the size of domestic financial markets 
however indicate the fast-rising financial potential of the emerging world (Figure 5). Whereas the rise 
of emerging finance will ultimately depend on liberalisation decisions, it is fair to expect it to 
vindicate the inclusion of major emerging countries in the G20 group.     
Figure 5: Size of domestic financial markets, 1988-2010 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank), authors’ calculations. 
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3. The G20 saga 
How successful was the G20 so far? The limited time (3 years) elapsed since its creation – or rather 
its upgrading, in November 2008, from an informal ministerial group to a forum of global economic 
coordination – makes it difficult to answer this question. Its agenda has evolved in line with 
economic developments and policy priorities. Its scope is still shaping up and implementation is very 
much in progress, not only because of delay. During its first three years it has mostly been chaired 
by G7 countries (US, UK, France), with the exception of Korea. The successive Mexican, Russian, 
Australian and Turkish presidencies of 2012-2015 will be a true test of the changes it can bring. 
Moreover, there is also another reason why a performance judgement is premature. Success ought to 
be measured against explicitly stated goals. The 'new' G20, convened in a rush in the dramatic post-
Lehman weeks, has so far had neither the time nor the desire to embark in a soul-searching 
discussion about ultimate objectives. The G20 exists, but its mission and role in the world economy 
are not well defined. For the moment, its focus evolves over time, driven by successive presidencies 
and urgencies (Table 1). 
Hence, the only systematic way to provide elements for a judgement is to study the G20 compliance 
with its own specific commitments, as contained in official communications – mainly communiqués 
released at the end of each meeting. This admittedly narrow approach facilitates the task, because 
the G20 has been in most cases rather explicit and detailed in spelling out its future work agenda. We 
will do this in two ways. Our first approach is to revisit the sequence of meetings – mainly summits, 
and where necessary ministerial – and discuss their outcomes. This narrative unavoidably reflects 
our own biases, concerning for example what the G20 should do and what expectations could 
justifiably be entertained ex-ante. We move to a more objective assessment in the next section.  
Table 1: From Washington to Cannes: An evolving agenda 
Summit Date Headline priorities 
Washington November 2008 • Financial reform 
London April 2009 • Global stimulus 
• Financial reform 
• International financial institutions  
Pittsburgh September 2009 • G20 governance 
• Rebalancing of world economy 
• Financial reform 
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Toronto June 2010 • Rebalancing of world economy 
• Financial reform 
Seoul November 2010 • Rebalancing of world economy 
• International financial institutions 
Cannes November 2011 • International monetary system 
• Commodity prices 
• Euro crisis 
 
3.1 Washington 
The Washington summit (15 November 2008) was convened, as we mentioned, at the peak of the 
global financial market tensions that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers. Several later claimed 
paternity of the idea, including the then UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the outgoing Bush 
administration and president Sarkozy of France, which held the rotating EU presidency at the time. 
As the US was holding presidential elections, leadership was more than usually exercised by the 
Europeans, among whom coordination had strengthened after an emergency meeting of euro area 
heads of state and government (and the UK), convened at the initiative of the French on 12 October 
to define common responses to the banking crisis.7  
Regardless of who can legitimately claim the initiative, two things about the Washington meeting are 
clear. The first is that it was unexpected, the second that it was well received by public opinions and 
financial markets. It amounted to positive news, which contributed to stabilise financial markets 
(table/chart with some market data). In a nutshell, it conveyed to market participants the sense that 
authorities were capable of agreeing on a forceful coordinated response to what appeared to be, at a 
time, a likely meltdown of the global financial system.  
Let’s examine the outcome of the Washington meeting in some detail. The concluding statement is 
rather short by usual standards (5 pages) and fully concentrated on the situation in the financial 
markets and on the actions to be taken to stabilise them. The diagnosis of the crisis only mentions 
macroeconomic factors (global imbalances, macro-policies) in a oblique way, mentioning 
“unsustainable global macroeconomic outcomes”. This was reportedly because the Chinese did not 
                                                 
7 That was still a time in which many, in Europe and elsewhere, thought that the transatlantic repercussions of the 
financial crisis would remain limited. The euro, so it was thought, was providing and would continue to provide an 
effective shelter against global financial instability. 
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want global imbalances to be explicitly mentioned among the root causes of the crisis, as this would 
have suggested that their surplus was somehow to blame for it. Macroeconomic issues would come 
later. Here is a quote from the relevant section: 
During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged stability 
earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate 
appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time, 
weak underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly 
complex and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined 
to create vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in 
some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the risks 
building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation, or take into 
account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory actions. Major underlying 
factors to the current situation were, among others, inconsistent and insufficiently 
coordinated macroeconomic policies, inadequate structural reforms, which led to 
unsustainable global macroeconomic outcomes. These developments, together, 
contributed to excesses and ultimately resulted in severe market disruption. 
The action plan, in addition to committing to all the necessary macroeconomic stimulus (monetary 
and fiscal) with due regard to individual country needs and conditions – a notion dear to the 
Europeans – is divided in 5 sections, all focused on financial markets and financial institutions: 
strengthening transparency and accountability; enhancing financial regulation, promoting integrity; 
reinforcing international cooperation and reforming the international financial institutions (IFIs). The 
agenda is further broken down into detailed tasks, in two parts: immediate actions to be 
implemented by 31 March 2009; and medium term actions. The G20 ministers, supported by an 
enlarged Financial Stability Forum (FSF), standard setting bodies and national supervisors, as well 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were entrusted with the task of monitoring and ensuring 
progress on the action list. In an informal way, the triangular governance structure (G20 on top, 
supported by FSF and IMF) that would be set up later, was taking shape. 
The Washington communiqué conveys a sense of urgency, focus and concreteness that could not be 
found in the traditional G7/G8 declarations. Instead of broad, often nebulous, open-ended political 
declarations encompassing a wide range of topics, it reads like what it is – an extremely focused 
action plan. The traditional set of commitments that can suit every participant, because it merely 
restates what they are already committed to nationally, cannot be found anywhere in the text. 
Instead, the language is precise, even technical - specialised institutions in charge of carrying out 
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work – the IMF, FSF, the Basel Committee, national regulators, etc. – are named and they are given 
strict deadlines for implementation.8      
3.2 London 
The London summit on 1-2 April 2009 is likely to remain in history as the moment when the 
international community united to ward off the risks of recession and protectionism. Indeed, it took 
place at a time when world output and trade were only beginning to stabilise – and this wasn’t known 
in real time. Observers were wondering whether the world was heading towards another Great 
Depression (Figure 6). In the same city where the countries participating in the World Economic 
Conference of 1933 had failed to find common ground, it provided a major impetus toward 
cooperation.     
Figure 6: Output and trade in the Great Depression and the Great Recession 
World Industrial Production World Trade 
Source: Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2010). 
The leaders convened in London just after the deadline of completion of the 'immediate actions' 
decided in Washington and aimed at restoring the functioning of financial markets. A Progress Report 
on the Washington Action Plan, published in London on 2 April, suggests with hindsight that most of 
the major areas of financial reform, such as bank capital strengthening, the definition of a new 
capital framework to avoid pro-cyclicality, new liquidity and risk management standards, IMF 
surveillance (including the decision to conduct a FSA for the United States), internal incentives and 
                                                 
8 For example, the first item of the financial regulation action plan, for implementation by 31 March 2009, reads “The IMF, 
expanded FSF, and other regulators and bodies should develop recommendations to mitigate pro-cyclicality, including 
the review of how valuation and leverage, bank capital, executive compensation, and provisioning practices may 
exacerbate cyclical trends.” 
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compensation practices, were underway, though in many cases they would be better defined later. 
Less clear was the progress achieved on transparency and accountability. As in earlier cases, 
progress towards harmonisation of accounting standards remained elusive. 
On financial regulation the London summit maintained the momentum launched in Washington, and 
also brought several new results. The final statement was again relatively short and to the point, 
explicitly indicating concrete actions to the undertaken. The leaders decided to reshape the FSF, 
transforming it into a Financial Stability Board (FSB) with broader representation (mirroring that of 
the G20) and an enhanced mandate. The FSB would, from then on, act as coordinator of all actions 
undertaken, in the area of financial regulation and supervision, by national and international 
standard setters. The leaders also started establishing the broad principles that would characterise, 
after a transition, the post-crisis bank capital standards: in the short term, until the macroeconomic 
recovery would strengthen, minimum capital requirements would remain unchanged or even decline, 
to facilitate lending; subsequently, prudential standard would be strengthened, building capital 
buffers above regulatory minima, increasing the quality of capital, mitigating the pro-cyclicality of 
capital ratios, (including a requirement that banks build capital buffers in good times), 
supplemented capital requirements with non-risk based measures, improving risk management 
incentives and enhancing liquidity buffers. In addition to capital standard, the London conclusions 
include provisions on hedge funds (registration, information gathering), credit derivatives 
(establishment of central counterparties), managerial compensation and bank board risk control 
responsibilities, credit rating agencies (registration and supervision, according to IOSCO rules). Still 
tentative were, on the contrary, the initiatives agreed in London concerning systemically important 
banks (SIFIs), shadow banks and accounting standards. 
The London summit also broadened the scope for action to include macroeconomic topics. The 
leaders stated that their countries were implementing fiscal expansion, monetary expansion and 
banking sector repair, indicating that these actions constituted “the largest fiscal and monetary 
stimulus and the most comprehensive support programme for the financial sector in modern times” 
and they pledged to conducting “all [their] economic policies cooperatively and responsibly with 
regard to the impact on other countries” – not an insignificant commitment for a number of non-G7 
countries which were used to regarding sovereignty over macroeconomic policy as nearly absolute. 
It is to be noted, however, that the declaration included no specific commitment in terms of either 
effort or date.  
The true innovation was the strengthening of the resources available to emerging and developing 
economies through the IFIs. The summit decided a $750bn overall increase of resources available 
through the IMF (of which $250bn in immediate, temporary bilateral loans, to be substituted at a 
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later stage by $500bn in form of an expansion of the Fund’s New Agreements to Borrow, plus SDR 
allocations for $250bn), as well as an increase in the capital endowments of the multilateral 
development banks, part of which earmarked for low income countries, and finally an increase in 
trade credit at the global level, to be channelled through the IFC. All this amounted to a historically 
unprecedented increase in the resources available to multilateral institutions. This support more 
than offset the restrictions that had been enacted in the preceding years, in a benign economic and 
financial environment. 
The reason for this massive increase in the resources available to support emerging and developing 
countries was the fear that at a time when advanced economies were struggling with the domestic 
fallout from the financial crisis, advanced and emerging countries would suffer from a major reversal 
of capital flows. Indeed, these countries, which had mostly been immune from the financial crisis 
until the Lehman shock, experienced a sudden stop in the third quarter of 2008. This was especially 
the case in emerging Europe and in Asia (Figure 7).  
Figure 7: Private capital Flows to Emerging Countries, 2001-2010 
Percentage of recipient region’s GDP 
 
Source: Bruegel calculations with IMF data. 
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3.3 Pittsburgh 
Five months later (September 2009), the summit in Pittsburgh marked what can be regarded as a 
sort of watershed. In a number of ways, in a climate of low expectations Pittsburgh achieved 
important results, but also coincided with a marked slowdown in the productivity of the G20.  
By the time the leaders gathered it was clear that a recovery was under way and optimism was on 
the rise: the October IMF forecast envisioned 3.1 per cent world growth in 2010, against 1.9 for the 
April forecast. The sense of urgency that had characterised the two previous meetings had abated 
and the policy focus was shifting on making preparations for more normal times. Nevertheless, the 
communiqué unambiguously emphasised that it was yet too early to remove the stimulus: 
We pledge today to sustain our strong policy response until a durable recovery is 
secured. We will act to ensure that when growth returns, jobs do too. We will avoid any 
premature withdrawal of stimulus. At the same time, we will prepare our exit 
strategies and, when the time is right, withdraw our extraordinary policy support in a 
cooperative and coordinated way, maintaining our commitment to fiscal 
responsibility.   
A first important result attained in Pittsburgh concerned institution-building. The leaders decided 
that the G20 summit would become a regular event, replacing the G8 at the top of the international 
financial architecture. In this framework, Finance Ministers would act as deputies, preparing agendas 
and implementing decisions, supported by the FSB and the IMF – the first responsible for financial 
markets, the second for macroeconomic surveillance and last-resort lending. The leaders also 
committed to a strengthening the voice of emerging and developing countries in the IMF through 
shifting by January 2011 at least five per cent of the quotas from overrepresented to 
underrepresented countries. However, because of US reluctance, they could not find agreement to 
announce that the heads of the Fund and the Bank would be appointed without condition of 
nationality. 
Regarding financial reform, a key challenge in Pittsburgh was to continue to exert guidance and 
preserve the reform momentum, while at the same time avoiding micro-management and excessive 
top-down command of what was bound to be increasingly technical discussions. In this area, the 
leaders struck a reasonable balance between direct guidance and delegation to the FSB and to the 
national authorities. On risk control the message was clear – strengthen capitalisation; extend the 
focus to leverage and liquidity; avoid pro-cyclical regulation – but implementation was left in the 
hands of the Basel Committee. A number of broad principles on compensation practices were 
established, but the task of working out the implications and, most importantly, to implement, was 
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left to the FSB and especially to national supervisors (which “should have the responsibility to review 
firms’ compensation policies and structures with institutional and systemic risk in mind...”). On 
moral hazard, the leaders asked for the establishment of bank resolution procedures and standing 
crisis management groups in all systemically important institutions, especially those operating 
across borders. 
The area where the G20 made the most important headway in Pittsburgh was that of global 
imbalances. The issue had been left aside in the two previous meetings, first to avoid turning the 
summits into US-Chinese confrontations and second, because the priority was to address financial 
regulation failures and the common risk of a depression. But it was becoming too important an issue 
for it to continue being avoided. First, in discussion on the causes of the crisis, the idea was gaining 
ground that large and persistent payments disequilibria among currency areas were among the 
contributors to systemic risk-building in previous years9. Second, the IMF was projecting for the 
medium term a rebound of imbalances (the October 2009 WEO envisaged that they would stabilise 
at about 2 per cent of world GDP – a projection that has not changed much since – against 2.5 to 3 
per cent in 2006-2007). Third, it was feared that in the years ahead demand in the advanced 
countries would remain subdued because of the extent of deleveraging and the coming fiscal 
retrenchment, and that to sustain global growth there was a need to foster demand in the emerging 
countries.     
On the eve of Pittsburgh it seemed unlikely that leaders would enter this contentious territory, but 
the outcome surpassed expectations. At the initiative of the USA, a 'framework' for macroeconomic 
policies was agreed upon, with the aim of making national policies ('fiscal, monetary, trade, 
structural') consistent with balanced growth, including regular consultations on commonly agreed 
policies and objectives. Agreement on the Framework represented an ambitious international 
coordination endeavour, which set differentiated goals to deficit countries and surplus countries10. 
Furthermore, the leaders instructed their Finance Ministers to put in place a surveillance process, 
the 'Mutual Assessment Process' (MAP) “to evaluate the collective implications of national policies 
for the world economy”. The IMF was asked to give technical support to this exercise in multilateral 
surveillance, working with G20 ministers and central banks, and to report regularly to the G20 
leaders.  
Unimportantly for the short term, but noticeably, Pittsburgh was also characterised by a significant 
broadening of the agenda: for the first time the communiqué mentioned at length energy security, 
                                                 
9 This link was made explicit in two influential European reports by Jacques de Larosière (2009) and Adair Turner (2009) 
on the reform of financial regulation. However, the idea remained disputed among academics and policymakers. 
10 As argued by Vines (2011). 
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climate change, poverty, jobs quality, and trade and investment. All important issues for sure, but on 
which commitments were more verbose than on core G20 business. 
3.4 Toronto  
In the year following Pittsburgh, the G20 calendar included two summit meetings under a joint 
Canadian-Korean chair: Toronto (June) and Seoul (November). In our view the Toronto meeting on 27 
June 2010 marked the lowest point in the short G20 history. The macroeconomic coordination 
framework virtually stalled against the test of delivering a joint assessment. The IMF, which was 
steering the process although its responsibility was in principle one of technical assistance only, 
was reluctant to move too fast to policy conclusions as it wanted first to educate governments to the 
process of information-sharing. At the same time specific circumstances contributed to rendering 
agreement difficult. In spring 2010 it was undisputable that the recovery was underway, but the 
fears of double-dip recession were still widespread. In all countries monetary and fiscal authorities, 
while beginning to think about 'exit strategies' and refer to them in public communication, 
maintained de-facto an accommodative stance. But the awareness was increasing that the revenue 
shortfall provoked by the recession (and to a lesser extent by the stimulus) would give rise, in time, 
to a historically unprecedented debt explosion. In the midst of the trade-off (expand now, 
consolidate later), positions were divided, Europeans being especially concerned about fiscal risks 
after the outbreak of the Greek crisis (which had led, weeks earlier, to what many regarded as a first 
controversial step towards a fiscal union, the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility) 
and the US, where unemployment had risen much more, being still decisively positioned in favour of 
fiscal expansion. The majority of participants in the summit emphasised the fiscal risks and the need 
for consolidation, as evident in this passages from the final statement:   
Recent events highlight the importance of sustainable public finances and the need for 
our countries to put in place credible, properly phased and growth-friendly plans to 
deliver fiscal sustainability, differentiated for and tailored to national circumstances. 
Those countries with serious fiscal challenges need to accelerate the pace of 
consolidation. 
and 
Sound fiscal finances are essential to sustain recovery, provide flexibility to respond to 
new shocks, ensure the capacity to meet the challenges of aging populations, and 
avoid leaving future generations with a legacy of deficits and debt. […]  Those with 
serious fiscal challenges need to accelerate the pace of consolidation. Fiscal 
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consolidation plans will be credible, clearly communicated, differentiated to national 
circumstances, and focused on measures to foster economic growth. 
Not least because of a convergence of views between the new British Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the tone of the final statement concerning macroeconomic 
policies was surprisingly emphatic about the need for fiscal consolidation, an orientation that left the 
US uncomfortably isolated. The advanced G20 countries agreed to halve fiscal deficits by 2013 and to 
reduce public debt ratios by 2016 if not before. The whole macroeconomic discussion was very much 
reminiscent of traditional US-European disputes, with the emerging countries playing a secondary 
role. In this respect, as well as in the fairly general tone of the discussion, the Toronto G20 summit 
was closer to a traditional G7 summit than to the meetings in London and Pittsburgh.  
At the same time the financial reform agenda had visibly slipped off the hands of the heads of state 
and government. It was left entirely in the hands of the FSB, without further political stimulus or 
guidance. This was probably an inevitable development in view of the technicality of the topics, but 
contributed to give the impression that the Toronto summit had very little to deliver.   
3.5 Seoul 
The Seoul G20 summit was the first to be chaired by a non-G7 country and Korea was especially keen 
on making it a success. It was not an easy task: on the macroeconomic front, a swift return to 
normality was reviving old problems. The currency dispute between the US and China was again 
making headlines and further controversies had erupted as many emerging countries were 
overwhelmed by capital inflows. 'Currency wars', in the words of Brazilian Finance Minister Guido 
Mantega, was the theme of the day. Simultaneously, the Mutual Assessment Process was proving 
more cumbersome and controversial than expected.  
In this climate, the Korean presidency was not able to achieve breakthrough on the controversial 
issues. An attempt was made to open a new road towards compromise between China and the US by 
stating that current account balances should remain below 4 per cent of GDP, but no agreement could 
be found in time for the summit.11  Heads of state and government could only agree to name the 
problem (a change from the initial reluctance to mention imbalances) and call for further work by 
their Finance Ministers. The corresponding sentences in the communiqué were particularly 
convoluted: 
Persistently large imbalances, assessed against indicative guidelines to be agreed by 
our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, warrant an assessment of their 
                                                 
11 According to former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2011), this was because of premature US public declarations.   
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nature and the root causes of impediments to adjustment as part of the MAP, 
recognizing the need to take into account national or regional circumstances, including 
large commodity producers. These indicative guidelines composed of a range of 
indicators would serve as a mechanism to facilitate timely identification of large 
imbalances that require preventive and corrective actions to be taken. 
An outcome from the MAP was a set of 'policy commitments' by the G20 members, in which each 
country indicated its policy goals in several fields (fiscal, financial, monetary and exchange rate, 
structural, development, other policies) and how they contributed to the Framework goals. The very 
fact that all participants agreed to commit to policy actions vis-à-vis partners was politically 
significant, but the commitments themselves did not represent departure from pre-existing policy 
course.  
Seoul was more successful on two other fronts: first, it delivered ahead of time on the Pittsburgh 
commitment to reform IMF governance, with a reform that shifted 6 per cent of quota shares toward 
under-represented countries.12 Second, it could take stock of agreement reach in the Basel 
Committee to revise bank capital adequacy ratios.  
Korea had been keen to open two new chapters in the international discussion. It had first proposed 
reflection and action on what it called 'financial safety nets', in other words mechanisms for giving 
countries access to liquidity when facing capital outflows. What was intended through providing 
better insurance was to remove the motive for self-insurance through reserve accumulation, which 
made discussion on the issue another, more systemic contribution to the discussion on global 
imbalances. The validity of the theme, that could encompass IMF facilities, regional agreements and 
swap agreements with the major central banks, was widely recognised, but achievements remained 
limited. The IMF announced in August 2010 a new low-conditionality facility, the Precautionary Credit 
Line (PCL) to complement the pre-existing Flexible Credit Line (FCL), but no agreement could be 
found on the more ambitious Global Stabilisation Mechanism (GSM). The theme however served as a 
bridge to discussions on reforming the International Monetary System under French presidency.           
The other chapter was development. It was indicative of the broadening of the G20 agenda from an 
initial focus on financial regulation and crisis management to a much broader, potentially very large 
set of issues. Clearly, Korea had substantive and political motives to open a new chapter – and so 
would future presidencies. But the downside was, inevitably, a lack of focus and significant 
deliverables.    
                                                 
12 Agreement was reached in a Finance Ministers meeting in Gyeongju on 22-23 October 2010.  
 24
3.6 Cannes 
The 2011 French presidency started off with an ambitious agenda. President Sarkozy announced 
from the outset  that “sticking to the agenda [of completing work in progress] would condemn the 
G20 to failure and the world to new crises”13 and he proposed to add new items to the agenda. In the 
event the summit itself was dominated by developments of the Greek crisis and a dispute among 
Europeans about the resources of the euro-area financial facility and proposals to increase of the 
resources at the disposal of the IMF for European operations.14 Nevertheless preparatory work 
covered a broader scope, very much in line with the three new French priorities and the leftovers 
from previous presidencies.  
The first new topic was the reform of the International Monetary System, which had not been 
addressed explicitly under the previous presidencies, though it was implicit in several topics under 
discussion such as the 'international financial safety nets'. The theme initially ('a monetary system 
to succeed Bretton Woods') was broad and grand enough to leave room for many interpretations, but 
discussions among Finance Ministers led to more modest outcomes: a broad consensus on the 
management of capital flows (but not the code of conduct initially contemplated), principles for 
cooperation between the IMF and regional financial arrangements, an action plan to develop local 
bond markets, and (instead of an actual inclusion of the renminbi) a commitment to review the 
composition of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket in 2015, with a view to enlarging it. France 
had hoped to be supported by China in its reform efforts, but the Chinese government remained 
throughout the discussions more cautious than suggested by a widely-quoted 2009 statement by 
the governor of its central bank (Zhou, 2009).        
The second element added was an entirely new chapter with on the volatility of commodity prices. 
The initial aim was to make progress towards limiting volatility through the regulation of derivative 
markets and improvements in market transparency, while at the same time finding ways to limit the 
adverse consequences of volatility. Here again, the outcome was more modest: the most notable 
achievement was the creation of an Agricultural Markets Information System.  
The third new element marked for the G20 the beginning of a more reflexive approach to its own role. 
Indeed it was not entirely clear whether the G20 was intended to substitute existing structure (as 
suggested by the statement that it had become 'the premier forum' for coordination), or to 
complement them. At the request of the French presidency, British PM David Cameron presented a 
report on G20 governance where he emphasised the need for the G20 to remain an informal body, 
                                                 
13 Speech at the French Ambassadors’ Annual Conference, 25 August 2010. 
14 An outline agreement on a special SDR allocation was rejected by Germany at the request of the Bundesbank.    
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reach out to non-members, and prioritise areas where existing global governance structures were in 
need for improvements. These conclusions were endorsed by the summit, which made clear that the 
G20 is “part of the overall framework of international governance”. Following Cameron’s 
recommendations, the decision was also taken to formalise the Troika of past, present and future 
presidencies.         
France also followed Korea and the US with a renewed stimulus towards the set-up of a scoreboard 
to monitor macroeconomic developments and policies, with a view to reducing global imbalances. 
The 2011 ministerial meetings led to an agreement on a two step approach: in the first stage, 
countries whose size and/or conditions may imply systemic risks for the global economy would be 
singled out, based on a limited set of indicators and a mix of analytical and statistical approaches. In 
the second stage, an in-depth analysis would be conducted on these countries15. This outcome is 
valuable because it breaks the stalemate prevailing in earlier meetings, in which leaders and 
ministers alike had been unable to give shape to their commitment to operationalise the 'Framework 
for sustainable and balanced growth' agreed in Pittsburgh. Furthermore, in the context of renewed 
economic concerns the Action Plan for Growth and Jobs agreed upon at the summit was fairly 
specific on the policy measures expected from the participants.16   
3.6 Summing up 
From November 2008 to the end of 2011 the G20 seems to have gone through a cycle. The initial, 
'emergency' period (Washington and London summits) was marked by swift action on financial 
reform and crisis mode. The Pittsburgh summit, while very effective in terms of institution building 
(establishment of a permanent G20, plus the macroeconomic 'Framework') marked the transition to 
the second stage, in which, in the context of fragile economic normalisation, renewed asymmetry 
between advanced and emerging countries, and reduced financial market tension, progress became 
slower.   
 
  
                                                 
15 The negotiation was particularly long and complex, largely around semantics. Reportedly, in the Paris meeting the 
drafting came to a gridlock over the acceptable use of the term “current account”, and the meeting lasted more than 14 
hours. In the end, as reported by the press, the list of countries singled out for second-stage examination, kept 
confidential, includes the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, China and India.  
16 For example, Italy committed to “reaching a rapidly declining debt-to-GDP ratio starting in 2012 and close to a balanced 
budget by 2013” while “Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Korea and Indonesia, where public finances remain 
relatively strong, taking into account national circumstances, [agreed] to let automatic fiscal stabilisers work and, 
should global economic conditions materially worsen, [agreed] to take  discretionary measures to support domestic 
demand as appropriate, while maintaining their medium-term fiscal objectives”.  
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4. Measures of success 
We now move on to assess achievements. Our first approach is to employ a set of performance 
scores available in the literature, that compiled by the University of Toronto. We then dig deeper with 
specific assessments of achievements in the two fields where the G20 has focused during its first 
three years, financial regulation and macroeconomic policies.    
4.1 Overall compliance 
We start by examining the compliance of the G20 with its own stated objectives, using the indicators 
elaborated at the University of Toronto (UoT). Researchers at this university have watched, for 
several years using a consistent methodology, the G8 and G20 processes, and compiled detailed 
scoreboards. There is a farly long time series of these scoreboard for the G8, and a much shorter one 
for the G20.  
In a nutshell, the methodology is the following: UoT research teams catalogue, for every G20 summit, 
the commitments expressed in the final statement, and then monitor compliance with these 
commitments in the period up to the next summit. For each commitment and each meeting, each 
country is judgmentally assigned a value of 1 if the commitment was fulfilled fully or nearly, of 0 if 
the commitment could not be fulfilled or was fulfilled only to a limited extent, and -1 if the country did 
not act17. The next step is to calculate average measures of the degree o compliance, separately for 
each meeting or each topic. A positive value means that there was at least partial compliance on 
average with the commitment made, while a value close to 0 or negative signals limited or no 
compliance. 
Table 2 reports simple average scores, divided by topic (upper part of the table) and meetings (lower 
part). Among the topics, for simplicity we have restricted attention to four: macroeconomic policy, 
financial reform, IFI reform and others (a heterogeneous mix including trade, development, climate 
change, terrorist financing and money laundering, etc). The last summit for which scores are 
available is Toronto. We calculated scores for the G20 as a whole and for the following sub-groups of 
members: the advanced countries, the advanced countries with a current account deficit, the 
emerging countries, the emerging countries with a current account deficit, the G7 and G7 Europe. We 
have also calculated the standard deviation across the G20, as a measure of the cross-country 
dispersion of the degree of compliance. 
                                                 
17 The basic methodology is due to von Fuerstenberg and Daniels (1992). See detailed explanations in the technical 
notes available from the University of Toronto G8 Information Center website 
(http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/index.html) 
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Table 2: Unweighted compliance scores 
2a Scores by topic 
  Macroeconomic policy Financial Reform IFI Other Average 
G20 0.55 0.27 0.48 0.31 0.40 
Advanced 0.66 0.57 0.89 0.58 0.67 
Advanced in deficit 0.67 0.60 0.83 0.62 0.68 
Emerging 0.46 -0.06 0.10 0.03 0.13 
Emerging in deficit 0.32 -0.04 0.20 0.13 0.15 
G7 0.65 0.63 0.93 0.60 0.70 
G7 Europe 0.73 0.74 0.88 0.66 0.75 
Memo: St-Dev G-20 total 0.31 0.41 0.49 0.35 0.39 
2b. Scores by summit 
  Washington London Pittsburgh Toronto Seoul Average
G20 0.51 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.50 0.35
Advanced 0.72 0.49 0.58 0.58 0.66 0.61
Advanced in deficit 0.80 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.71 0.65
Emerging 0.19 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 0.32 0.08
Emerging in deficit 0.28 0.08 -0.08 -0.09 0.36 0.11
G7 0.72 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.61
G7 Europe 1.00 0.65 0.59 0.61 0.71 0.71
Memo: St-Dev G-20 total 0.59 0.43 0.45 0.34 0.24 0.41
Source: University of Toronto G20 Information Center, authors’ calculations 
Two pieces of evidence are immediately apparent. First, almost all numbers are positive. This means 
that, based on the criteria used, there was at least some compliance in most cases. For the G20 as a 
whole, and as an average across all meetings, the score is 0.40, with a standard deviation of 0.39, 
which means that a large part of the distribution, including that comprised between ± sigma, lies in 
the positive range. The only negative numbers regard emerging countries in the area of financial 
reform.  
Surprisingly, the overall G20 compliance in the area of financial reform is rather low (0.27). This, 
however, depends entirely on the negative score of emerging countries (where financial reform may 
be perceived as less urgent that other areas), and on the fact that the averages reported in the table 
are unweighted (which implies for example that the US, with a GDP share in total G20 close to 25 
percent and an even larger share in terms of financial market size, is weighted equally to Indonesia, 
that has a share of 1 percent in total GDP). This suggests that performance in this domain tended to 
be stronger for large developed countries. Weighted scores will be presented later. 
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The second finding is that compliance drops after the first meeting (Washington), remained low for 
London and Pittsburgh, and recovered somewhat for Seoul.  Interestingly, both the decline after 
Washington and the recovery for Seoul are visible in both the advanced and the emerging country 
groups, which suggests that there was a genuine meeting effect. However, the two groups of 
countries are characterised by sharply different levels of compliance, the advanced ones having a 
much higher score than the emerging ones. To the extent that this concerns financial reform, the 
signal is not necessarily disappointing, since reforming the financial sector was (and remains) a 
priority principally in the advanced countries. The G20 financial reform agenda was meant to trigger 
action in the advanced countries and it should be no surprise to observe that it is in these countries 
that it was most effective.  
Note that, after London, the average compliance increased steadily, with a somewhat stronger 
increase in the Seoul meeting. This suggests that the commitments, while perhaps no longer 
constituting breakthroughs relative to expectations, gradually became more realistic and 
achievable. More generally, the indicators in the table measure the effectiveness or success in 
translating G20 decisions into national legislation, whereas our qualitative judgements in the 
previous sub-section were based on the communiqués after G20 meetings. The two approaches are 
different, and indeed complementary because the earlier one focused on the quality of the 
commitments expressed at the meetings, while the indicators measure the extent to which those 
commitments wee actually put into practice.  
One striking implication of this difference regards the judgement on the London meeting. This 
meeting's outcome was judged by us and others very favourably, based on the commitments 
expressed in the final statement. However, compliance with those commitments appears to have 
been less positive. Implementation was still good in 'resisting protectionism and promoting global 
trade and investment', but it was low in 'ensuring a fair and sustainable recovery for all' (official 
development assistance, particularly for the poorest countries) and 'the scope of regulation' 
(financial regulation). It should be mentioned that the increase of IMF resources, a major 
achievement of London, is not among the 'priority commitments' chosen by the UoT to measure ex-
post compliance with that meeting. The reason is unclear, hence this may introduce a negative bias 
in the ex-post judgement of the London meeting. It is interesting to note that the UK was the only 
country that complied fully with all commitments on that occasion, according to the UoT indicators; a 
possible 'chair effect'. 
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Among the topics, the highest scores are obtained by macroeconomic policies and IFI reform. Again, 
advanced countries show higher compliance18. On macro policies, the positive score, despite slow 
progress in setting up the 'Framework for Sustainable and Balanced Growth', is attributable to the 
timely enactment of the stimulus policies agreed mainly in the Washington meeting. 
Table 3 reports similar scores, but weighted by GDP19. The main difference with the earlier table is in 
the much higher score observed in the area of financial reform, that in many cases now surpass that 
of macro policies. This shows that the degree of compliance in the commitments relating to finance 
and banking was highly skewed towards the large countries: among the advanced countries the US, 
and among the emerging ones China and India. All in all, the GDP-weighted scores are uniformly 
higher across the table. 
Table 3: Average compliance scores (GDP-weighted) 
3a Scores by topic 
  
Macroeconomic 
policy 
Financial 
Reform IFI Other Average 
G20 0.47 0.52 0.64 0.44 0.52 
Advanced 0.44 0.63 0.95 0.49 0.63 
Advanced in deficit 0.36 0.67 0.93 0.47 0.61 
Emerging 0.49 -0.05 0.06 0.08 0.14 
Emerging in deficit 0.25 -0.12 0.06 0.13 0.08 
G7 0.42 0.65 0.97 0.49 0.63 
G7 Europe 0.74 0.75 0.90 0.66 0.76 
Memo: St-Dev G-20 total 0.31 0.41 0.49 0.35 0.39 
3b Scores by summit 
  Washington London Pittsburgh Toronto Seoul Average 
G20 0.77 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.58 0.50 
Advanced 0.76 0.46 0.55 0.49 0.55 0.56 
Advanced in deficit 0.89 0.49 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.58 
Emerging 0.23 -0.14 -0.06 0.14 0.40 0.11 
Emerging in deficit 0.11 0.02 -0.27 -0.03 0.39 0.04 
G7 0.76 0.47 0.54 0.48 0.54 0.56 
G7 Europe 1.00 0.68 0.61 0.60 0.69 0.72 
Memo: St-Dev G-20 total 0.59 0.43 0.45 0.34 0.24 0.41 
Source: University of Toronto G20 Information Center, authors’ calculations 
                                                 
18 The compliance with the IFI reform commitments is calculated with reference to the national ratification of the 
international accords, and/or with the countries “taking an active stance in addressing the reforms”. This explains why 
compliance scores differ across countries, even if these reforms are collective in nature.  
19 Details on calculations and weighting. Are in the appendix. 
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Table 4 shows a comparison of historical records between the G20 and the G7/G8. The message here 
is that the compliance of the G20 is not much worse than that of its much older and more 
experienced 'brother'. This is a non-negligible achievement in view of the ambitious agenda of the 
recent G20s and of the much more precise character of the commitments. Again, the difference that 
exists is attributable to the lower level of compliance in the emerging components of the G20, 
considering that the scores of the US and Europe are not much different in the two 'Gs'.  
Table 4: Comparative performance of G20 and G8 
 
The staff of the IMF also prepared for the Cannes summit a 'G20 Accountability Report' (IMF, 2011d) 
that reviews the implementation of the Toronto and Seoul summits in four areas (monetary and 
exchange rates, fiscal, financial and structural policies). However, this report provides a broad 
assessment of the appropriateness of the policy course in G20 countries, taking as benchmarks the 
summit communiqués but also policies that Fund staff considers appropriate in view of the evolution 
of economic conditions. Furthermore, it does not provide country-by-country assessments. For this 
reason it cannot be used as a basis for a systematic assessment. Overall, the report does not 
contradict the above findings. It assesses that “there has been more progress toward satisfying the 
letter of the Summit declarations than addressing the difficult reforms needed for long-run 
sustainability and balanced growth” and finds that progress on the financial and structural reforms 
has been slow.  
4.2 – Financial sector reform 
Rottier and Véron (2010) have conducted a more in-depth, detailed examination of the 
implementation of the leaders’ commitments at the Washington summit, with a focus on financial 
regulation. They therefore provide a useful complement to the UoT assessment.  
Rottier and Véron list 47 action items in the financial communiqué, 39 of which relate to financial 
regulation. They consider three criteria:  
London Pittsburgh Toronto Avg 1990s 2000s Avg
Group average 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.37 0.49 0.44
US 0.4 1 0.33 0.58 0.47 0,44 0,45
EU 0.6 0.38 0.57 0.52 0.37 0.54 0.47
G20 (established 2008) G7/G8 (established 1975)
Calculations based on data from the Compliance Reports of the G20 and G8 Information Centers of the
University of Toronto. The entries are simple averages of elementary compliance scores, ranging from -1 (no
compliance) to +1 (full compliance). Elementary scores are judgemental estimates and are reported
separately for each country and for groups of main agenda items (macro policies, financial regulation,
development aid, trade, etc.)
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• Effectiveness of implementation, grading it from 0 (nothing done) to 5 (fully implemented);  
• Cross-border consistency of implementation measures, ranking from 0 (no coordination) to 3 
(fully consistent or harmonised); 
• Follow-up initiatives (scoring from 0 to 2).   
Rottier and Véron do not grade countries separately but they distinguish between channels for 
implementation, depending on the degree to which implementation relied on voluntary action by 
national authorities or, on the contrary, fell into the remit of international institutions. This approach 
leads them to distinguish four ‘groups’ (Table 5).  
Table 5: Rottier and Véron’s assessment of the implementation of the Washington commitments 
  
Effectiveness 
score (betw.  
0 and 5) 
Consistency 
score (betw.  
0 and 3) 
Follow-up 
score (betw.  
0 and 2) 
Total score 
(betw.  0 and 
10) 
Group 1 (national authorities) 2 0.6 0.6 3.2
Group 2 (FSB) 2.63 1 1 4.63
Group 3 (BCBS, IASB, IOSCO, IAIS, 
FATF) 
3.28 1.72 1.28 6.28
Group 4 (IMF, OECD, World Bank) 3.82 2.45 1.45 7.73
Source: Rottier and Véron (2010). 
What is interesting in these results is that they highlight the degree to which the effectiveness of the 
G20 depends on that of the implementing agent – national authorities or international agencies. 
Rottier and Véron show that the latter have on average been more effective – much more when they 
could claim full authority as opposed to a mere coordination role. The difference in the quality of 
implementation is – unsurprisingly – especially striking as regards cross-border consistency.  
This analysis portends more general conclusions, to which we will return in the discussion on 
governance. The G20 is a political body and it does not have sub-structures to rely on, not even a 
secretariat. Depending on the topic, it has therefore relied on voluntary, non-binding commitment by 
national authorities, on stricter forms of cooperation, or on supranational regulation. Unsurprisingly, 
Rottier and Véron find that the first one, which is the more politically expedient form of coordination, 
is also the less effective.  
 
 32
4.3 Macroeconomic coordination: Phase 1  
As indicated in section 3, G20 macroeconomic coordination went through two successive phases. In 
the first one, from Washington to Pittsburgh included, the focus was on stimulating the economy 
across the board. All countries were requested to contribute, to the extent permitted by the domestic 
fiscal situation. In the second one, from Toronto onwards, it shifted towards a more complex set of 
objectives, with the aim of combining continued support for growth, budgetary consolidation, and the 
prevention of imbalances. There was also much less consensus in the second phase than in the first 
one.  
Achievements of the first phase are relatively easy to assess. On the fiscal front, data confirm that a 
stimulus was engineered not only in the advanced G20 group but also, and to a broadly similar 
extent, in the emerging group (Figure 8). Russia, India and China were among the countries where 
the 2008-2009 stimulus effort was the largest.20  Whereas it was natural for emerging countries to 
rely more on discretionary action because government expenditures represent a lower fraction of 
GDP and, as a consequence, automatic stabilisers are smaller, the full participation of the emerging 
group to the concerted stimulus was nevertheless a remarkable event. Emerging countries were 
traditionally viewed as passive players in a global macroeconomic coordination game dominated by 
the members of the G7. The fact that they fully took part in the stimulus was indicative of their new 
global role and was an ex-post vindication of the very creation of the G20.21    
  
                                                 
20 A problem with measuring the fiscal impulse by changes in the structural primary balance, as done here, is 
the latter is affected by changes in the evaluation of potential output or the elasticity of taxes. These 
technical revisions are normally of limited impact, but they were substantial in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. For this reason our measurement is likely to overstate the size of the stimulus. A better 
approach is what the IMF (2010) called the “action-based approach”. However available data do not allow 
implementing it for the G20 countries. 
21 There was significant heterogeneity within the emerging G20 group, but not markedly more than within the advanced 
countries group.  
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Figure 8: Fiscal Impulse in the G20, 2008-2010 
 
Note: Fiscal impulse is measured by the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. Data are from the 
IMF’s Spring 2011 Fiscal Monitor. 
 
There was more heterogeneity on the monetary front because situations differed markedly. In 
Europe and the US, central banks had had to resort to enhanced credit or liquidity support policies as 
early as in 2007, more than a year before the Washington summit, but no such action was in order in 
Japan or the emerging world. Even after the Lehman shock, access to domestic-currency liquidity 
remained much less problematic in the emerging world and in Japan that in the US and Europe.  
What is harder to assess is to what degree action undertaken at national level was triggered by G20 
coordination. In a situation of global demand shortfall, high risk aversion and partial paralysis of 
financial markets, the policy prescription was about the same everywhere, irrespective of the degree 
of coordination. It is likely, however, that the G20 meetings helped focus the policymakers’ attention 
on a well-defined policy package, facilitating also domestic consensus, and that they made each and 
every government more secure that it would not act in isolation.  
Implementation of the multilateral part of the G20 crisis agenda is by contrast easy to assess. As 
indicated in section 3, the London summit agreed on a $500bn increase in IMF resources (through 
temporary bilateral loans for $250bn, to be later substituted by an increase of the NABs), and on a 
special allocation of SDRs. The increase in IMF resources was enacted swiftly and made possible a 
large increase in lending through standard programmes, as well as the granting of credit lines to 
selected countries through two new facilities, the FCL and the PCL. 
Figure 9 plots the evolution of IMF resources and commitments from 2007 to 2010. It shows that 
without the replenishment of resources at the time of the London summit the commitment capacity 
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of the Fund would have been severely constrained already in 2009. It also indicates that by end-
2010, half of these new resources had been almost entirely used up, as the Fund’s uncommitted 
usable resources and one-year commitment capacity were both at, or slightly above their 2007 
level.22 With hindsight, the increase in Fund resources seems to have been of the right magnitude, at 
least taking into account the size of the subsequent assistance programmes.23    
Figure 9: IMF resources and commitments, 2007-2010 
 
Source: IMF, Authors’ calculations. 
Other initiatives with the Fund have not yet delivered major results. By end-2011 only three 
countries, Colombia, Mexico and Poland, had had access to the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), and only 
one, the FYROM (Macedonia) had had access to the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL). None had drawn 
on these facilities. As to the exceptional $250 SDR allocation, subsequent data suggest that effective 
usage of SDR by IMF members was limited and restricted mainly to small countries several of which 
under IMF programme. It seems unlikely on this basis that the allocation contributed significantly to 
revive global demand and growth. 
  
                                                 
22 As the expanded NABs were only made effective in March 2011, resources recorded in Figure 3 only include $250bn in 
temporary bilateral loans to the Fund.   
23 In 2008-2010 the IMF concluded 19 stand-by agreements, including large-scale ones with Greece, Romania and the 
Ukraine and four extended arrangements, including a large-scale one with Ireland.   
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4.4 Macroeconomic coordination: Phase 2 
Whereas Phase 1 was conceptually simple, Phase 2 was more complicated because it was meant to 
involve a differential treatment of participating countries. The intellectual background to it was the 
Obama administration’s and the IMF’s fear that the recovery would leave international imbalances 
largely untouched. Writing at the end of 2009, Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) were warning 
that “One of the three central adjustments emphasized in the earlier multilateral consultations has 
taken place, namely the increase in U.S. private saving. Two remain to be implemented, lower fiscal 
deficits in the U.S., and lower current account surpluses in China and a number of other emerging 
market countries. If these do not take place, there is a high risk that the recovery will be weak and 
unbalanced. Staying in midstream is dangerous.” 
Against this background the goal, to quote from the Pittsburgh declaration, was to develop “a 
forward-looking analysis of whether policies pursued by individual G20 countries are collectively 
consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories for the global economy” that would feed 
into the leader’s discussions, which could result in agreeing on “actions to meet our common 
objectives”. This was the purpose of the 'Mutual Assessment Process' (MAP). The name of the game 
was to make all participating governments more conscious of the international spillover effects of 
their actions and, through peer pressure, to lead them to amend policy course in case of global 
inconsistency.  
The initial strategy for making coordination work was to ask each country to submit medium-term 
policy frameworks and plans. The staff of the IMF was entrusted with the task of checking 
consistency of national assumptions and policy directions, providing feedback to G20 members and 
evaluating policy alternatives. This was intended to be a multi-stage iterative process involving: (1) 
initial submissions by G20 governments; (2) aggregation and multilateral consistency check by the 
IMF; (3) evaluation of alternative policy paths by the IMF; and (4) discussions on policy adjustments 
among G20 members (Box 1).24    
  
                                                 
24 See the communiqué of the St Andrews G20 Ministerial Meeting in November 2009, IMF (2009) and IMF (2010b, 2010c 
and 2011c).  
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Box 1: Early steps of the Mutual Assessment Process 
The MAP started in early 2010 with the submission by G20 members of medium-term 'policy 
frameworks' (read: projections) by individual G20 members according to a common template. These 
'raw' projections included a number of cross-country inconsistencies because they had been 
prepared at different times, did not cover the same period, were based on different assumptions as 
regards, for example, the price of oil, or evaluated differently the consequences of the crisis on 
potential output. Furthermore, each included (explicitly or implicitly) assumptions as regards policy 
and outcomes in the partner countries that were not mutually consistent. These 'raw' projections 
served as inputs for preparation by Fund services of a 'refined' scenario exempt of major 
inconsistencies. This sometimes resulted in significant adjustments to individual country 
projections (for example, US GDP was revised downwards by 0.8 per cent over the 2010-2014 
period).  
In a second step, the Fund evaluated through model simulations whether concerted policy actions by 
the major players could improve the global outcome. Three 'layers' of action were identified and 
evaluated: (a) reforms to boost internal demand in emerging surplus countries (primarily China); (b) 
further fiscal consolidation in advanced economies (primarily the US); (c) across-the-board 
structural reforms to increase the growth potential. This set of policies was evaluated to result in 
higher growth, faster fiscal consolidation and a reduction in global imbalances.       
The MAP exercise was carried out in Spring 2010 for the preparation of the Toronto summit and in 
Autumn 2010 for the preparation of the Seoul summit. Growth projections in the second vintage of 
submissions was more cautious than in the first one, that Fund staff had assessed too optimistic. 
This suggests that there has been some learning in the process.  
 
As conducted for the Toronto and Seoul meetings, the MAP was a cumbersome exercise technically 
and it resulted in projections of uncertain accuracy. Discrepancies between MAP and World Economic 
Outlook projections are supposed to signal biases in the evaluation by G20 countries of the likely 
global outlook – in its report for the Cannes summit, for example, the IMF staff (2011c) assessed 
national projections underlying the MAP outlook as 'too sanguine' – but they could also indicate 
forecast errors by Fund staff. The coexistence of two sets of projections, both of which emanate from 
the Fund, was also confusing for observers and policymakers. Furthermore, the MAP were not a 
necessary input to policy simulations: those could equally be carried out on the basis of WEO 
projections. The value of the MAP was probably more in the process leading to them: whereas WEO 
projections are entirely of the responsibility of Fund staff, MAP projections were the result of a 
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bottom-up process. More than a top-down exercise, this may have facilitated genuine discussions on 
the challenges facing the world economy and national economic policies.   
As indicated above, at the Seoul meeting it was agreed to 'enhance' the MAP by outlining 'concrete 
policy commitments' for each of the members and by assessing 'the nature and root causes of 
impediments to adjustment' behind 'persistently large external imbalances'. This agreement – by 
itself a progress in comparison to the initial silence on the issue of global imbalances – opened the 
way to a more ambitious attempt at multilateral surveillance.25   
Open discussion may or may not trigger policy action. As already indicated, a set of indicators and 
guidelines intended to help tackle global imbalances through policy adjustment in the key countries 
was adopted in April 2011 at the G20 ministerial in Washington, DC (Box 2). These indicators were in 
turn used by the IMF staff to identify seven key countries experiencing imbalances, to provide a 
broad-brush assessment of their underlying causes, and to make corresponding recommendations 
(IMF, 2011c). In effect, the Fund essentially indicated that imbalances had been driven by saving 
behaviour and it recommended fiscal consolidation for some (France, Japan, the UK, the US and 
India), the removal of distortions that keep Chinese savings artificially high, and measures to lower 
corporate savings in Japan and Germany. These recommendations were in part taken on board in the 
Cannes G20 Action Plan: leaders expressed agreement to differentiated budgetary consolidation 
strategies, including through letting automatic stabilisers work in Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
Germany, Korea and Indonesia (without excluding further discretionary stimulus if needed). This was 
a non-negligible achievement but, obviously, does not guarantee implementation. 
  
                                                 
25 Building on the agreement, IMF staff prepared for Cannes a whole set of reports: an Accountability Report 
(vis-à-vis the Seoul commitments), a MAP Report, a Sustainability Report (with appendix reports for seven 
countries identified as experiencing imbalances: the US, China, Japan, India, France, Germany, and the UK) 
and an Umbrella Report. See IMF (2011c).    
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Box 2: Indicators and guidelines for identification of required policy action 
The G20 Finance Ministers in February and April 2011 agreed on:  
• A process leading to the identification of countries whose policies deserve closer examination 
and discussion. 
• A set of indicators to monitor. These are (i) internal imbalance indicators (public debt and fiscal 
deficits; private savings rate and private debt) (ii) external imbalance indicators (current 
account balances, though they are not named because of Chinese reluctance to have them 
explicitly included in the list). External imbalance assessment is to take “due consideration of 
exchange rate, fiscal, monetary and other policies”.  
• Indicative guidelines against which each of these indicators are to be assessed. It is stated that 
“while not policy targets, these guidelines establish reference values for each available indicator 
allowing for identification of countries for the second step in-depth assessment”.  
• Four approaches to assess individual country positions. These are (i) a 'structural approach' 
presumably inspired by the IMF’s GGER methodology for the assessment of equilibrium 
exchange rates (IMF, 2006); (ii) a statistical approach which benchmarks G20 countries on the 
basis of their national historical trends; (iii) a statistical approach which benchmarks G20 
country's historical indicators against groups of countries at similar stages in their development; 
(iv) a statistical approach which draws on data, benchmarking G20 country's indicators against 
the full G20. The three statistical approaches are primarily based on data for the 1990-2004 
period and they are expected to be based on simple methodologies. In all cases, forecasts for 
2013-2015 are to be assessed against the four guidelines.  
• A categorization of countries into two groups: seven systemic countries, and the rest of the G20. 
Selection criteria will be stricter for the second group, so that they will only be selected for 
review if they depart significantly from benchmarks. The goal is to help the process focus on the 
most important countries – presumably again the US and China. 
Whether the MAP will have lasting traction and help change the policy conversation in the 
main participating countries also remains to be seen. One potential difficulty is that it de 
facto focuses on a narrow subset of countries – those with large external surpluses and 
deficits – but it is not clear which of these countries is ready to trade a change in its own 
policy for a change in its partner’s policy. Would, for example, a Chinese exchange-rate 
adjustment facilitate a US budget agreement? The political economy of international horse 
trading is highly uncertain.  
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Finally, a potentially problematic issue is that the whole exercise is predicated on the 
assumption that global imbalances remain a serious concern for the world economy going 
forward. Indicators, guidelines and processes may serve coordination well if this assumption 
proves correct. Should other problems – say, public debt risks in the advanced countries, or 
global inflation – because a major cause for concern, they may rather prove to be a 
distraction. There is a difficult trade-off here: to keep focusing on the same issue helps 
narrowing down differences through the development of common concepts, indicators and 
guideposts. As indicated by the European experience, this process takes time, and for the 
outcome of this process to influence national policies even more time is needed. The same 
requirement applies even more to coordination within a large group whose participants are 
not used to speaking openly to the others about their policy choices. But keeping the focus 
on a particular set of issues involves the risk of focusing the policymakers’ attention on a 
certain set of problems as the expense of others. Again, Europe provides a clear case of 
attention distraction: its focus on making its fiscal pact operational has distracted the 
policymakers’ attention from the build up of large imbalances in the private sector.      
4.5 Conclusions 
Four conclusions stand out. The first is that the G20 process is an ambitious one and that it has 
delivered more than the G7 in its last decades. The second is that degree of compliance of the G20 is, 
on average, far from disappointing. This conclusion emerges both from a systematic and rather 
‘blind’ analysis of the follow-up to all commitments and from a more focused analysis of some key 
issues. The third is that there were important signs of fatigue after the first meetings, at the time the 
first signs of international recovery became visible, but that there was some recovery lately. The last 
is that the degree of compliance of emerging countries is on average lower than that of advanced 
countries.  
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5. Looking ahead: small fixes and big hurdles 
Is the 'new' G20 working as it was initially hoped, or at least sufficiently well? Is it evolving, and in 
what direction? What lies ahead? For an institution that assigned itself the role the 'premier forum of 
economic cooperation' (Pittsburgh summit, final statement) presumably for an indefinite future, 
three years of life if a remarkably short time to base a judgement on. Even more so it is to venture 
into predictions on its eventual impact or survival, on which the verdict will belong to historians. Yet 
this debate has already started, involving economists and political scientists. Not surprisingly there 
are two camps; those who support the new formation, or are at least willing give credit to it by 
adopting a wait-and-see attitude, and those inclined towards early disappointment and dismissal. 
Absent a solid and sustained performance record, both camps have apparently convincing 
arguments. 
5.1 Crisis management vs. long-term governance 
Towards the beginning of 2011 observers on either side agreed that a transition had occurred, 
between a crisis management mode, ie a phase in which leaders reacted under pressure to dramatic 
events in the financial markets with the single clear aim of preventing a global financial meltdown, to 
a sort of longer-term governance mode. In the latter and more recent mode of operation, the 
immediate risks of financial collapse or of a repeat of the Great Depression had receded, and the 
focus had shifted to the objective of managing interdependence and designing and implementing 
macroeconomic and financial reforms for the longer term.  
While this transition is natural and in fact desirable, it created three problems: 
• First, the objectives were no longer so clear. Putting the world economy on a balanced and 
sustainable growth footing, or avoiding another crisis, are very general statements, of little help 
when it comes to restricting the range of concrete policy choices;  
• Second, not unrelated, responses involved more asymmetry across countries and there was 
more scope for disagreement. This applies by definition to the management of imbalances but to 
many other policy fields also, because in the aftermath of the crisis advanced and emerging 
countries found themselves in very different situations as regards, for example, growth, inflation 
and public finances. As regards financial regulation, there was asymmetry too between the 
advanced countries that had experienced the crisis and where there was (admittedly somewhat 
uneven) appetite for reform, and the emerging countries where concern were inevitably less 
widespread;  
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• Third, as a consequence, public communication had become more of a challenge. What is not 
well understood is difficult to summarise, the old motto goes; certainly it is to choose effective 
words for a final communiqué when the underlying substance is elusive or controversial.  
When did the transition occur? As discussed in section 3, the first 'mode' clearly characterised the 
Washington and London summits (November 2008 and April 2009), the first taking place in the 
midst of the financial turmoil and at the start of the recession, the second when the recession was 
ending but evidence of this was not yet available. The transition to the second phase is located 
somewhere in the vicinity of the Pittsburgh meeting (September 2009). Woods (2010) considers 
London as the “highpoint of cooperation”, whereas in her view Pittsburgh marked the “return to 
politics as normal”, and “Toronto achieved little”. We agree on Toronto but take a partly different view 
on Pittsburgh. This summit in our view carried substantial weight, in itself and relative to 
expectations, because of the announcements of a novel policy architecture, orbiting around the G20 
and with the FSB, the IMF and other standard setters as operational arms (see Angeloni 2009a and 
2009b). The other substantial contribution from that summit was the launch of the 'Framework for 
Growth' embodying the IMF-driven 'Mutual Assessment Process' (MAP). We do concur, however, that 
subsequent work on implementing the Pittsburgh agreements fell short of hopes, for over a year. In 
subsequent articles we were also rather critical of the second phase – see Pisani Ferry (2010) and 
Angeloni (2011).  
At the time of writing (end-2011) a relevant question is whether the G-20 should still play by the 
rules of this longer-term mode or revert to the crisis management mode. Certainly the combination of 
a sovereign crisis in Europe, a slowdown in the US and a (hopefully soft) landing in China calls for 
stepping up coordination and cooperation. It is hard to assess the Cannes summit in this respect 
because leaders were taken aback by unforeseen development in Greece, but at the very least it did 
not go far in the definition of a joint response to the worsening of the global situation.        
5.2 What should the G20 do? 
If views diverge on timing, even more they do on interpretation. Some regard the passage to from the 
'crisis' to the 'governance' phase as a sign of maturity, the G20 being able to demonstrate (or at least 
not to immediately contradict) its ability to last beyond the emergency and make a positive 
contribution also in normal times. Some see it following the path that led the G7 to transform from 
focused and effective to grandiose, all-encompassing and largely ineffectual.    
In the crisis management mode the heads of state took direct responsibility for both macroeconomic 
and financial regulation decisions. A simple comparison between the broad and vague G7 
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communiqués and those issued at the first G20 summits provides strong evidence of this 
extraordinarily hands-on behaviour. This was evidently not sustainable. It is not the role of heads and 
state and government to dictate the details of financial regulatory reform and a normalisation was 
both inevitable and desirable. In normal times it is more appropriate for the G20 to function “as a 
steering committee that provides political energy and direction to international standard setters and 
also assesses progress of implementation”, to quote from Dan Price (2011), the former Sherpa of 
President George W. Bush. One of us (Angeloni, 2009), in commenting post-Pittsburgh 
developments, has taken a similar view.  
Observers also emphasise the change in style and the deterioration in public communication 
between the two phases. Critics argue that the G20 will not be able to display, in a climate of 
economic recovery and stabilised financial markets, the same alertness and effectiveness it showed 
as a crisis manager. History can be suggestive; Woods (2010) notes that a similar regress 
characterised, years earlier, the G20 Finance Ministers formation. Created in 1999 to respond to the 
global risks generated by the Asian crisis, hence in a crisis management spirit, the G20 ministerial 
formation gradually transformed itself, inadvertently, in a non-committal discussion forum, and its 
influence declined. G20 summits could follow a similar fate.  
To a certain extent, therefore, the move from a 'crisis management' to a 'governance' mode results 
more from the G20’s current capabilities than from the nature of the situation it is confronted to. 
Against the background of a serious deterioration of the global economic situation, this evolution 
involves risks: a G20 that would fail to address the priority problems of global adjustment and growth 
would soon lose the legitimacy earned in the management of the 2008-2009 global crisis.    
5.3 Large but not universal  
With 19 countries plus the two-headed EU, the G20 is a large group, even more so when taking into 
account the participation of Spain (permanent guest), the countries invited on behalf of regional 
groupings (Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Singapore and the UAE), and international organisations 
(FSB, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN, World Bank, WTO). This is clearly too large a group for dealing with 
macroeconomic and monetary issues, for which only a few countries or groupings are relevant. There 
were five participants in the Multilateral Consultations (China, the euro area, Japan, Saudi Arabia and 
the US), the G20 now has singled out seven systemic countries (China, India, France, Germany, 
Japan, the UK and the US), and there are talks of enlarging the SDR so that it would consist of five 
currencies (dollar, euro, pound sterling, renminbi and yen). Clearly, the international community is 
trying to find ways to narrow down the discussion to those who really matter.      
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At the same time the G20 is still not universal: it represents 85 per cent of world GDP, but only two-
thirds of the total population and one-tenth of the total number of countries. This is problematic for 
two reasons: first, countries not represented in it naturally question its legitimacy and request a 
representation in it (Vestergaard, 2010). This is a significant difference with the G7 which clearly had 
the character of a leadership group and was for three decades able to resist enlargement. Second, as 
noted by Woods (2010), non-universality formally limits the G20 to the role of an agenda-setter, not 
a rules-setter because it cannot make rules for the countries not represented in it. This distinction is 
important for regulatory matters where the G20 has de facto acted as a rule-setter (even though 
formal decision-making was delegated to the competent bodies).  
It has been advocated, notably by former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Pascal Lamy, the 
head of the WTO, to resolve this tension by moving to a constituency system analogous to that in use 
at the IMF.26 This would require several member countries to take responsibility for representing 
current non-members. An evolution of this sort is probably inevitable in the long run if the G20 retains 
a major role in world governance. A formal constituency system would however involve the weighting 
of votes and joint decision-making, neither of which squares well with representation at head of state 
and government level.   
5.4 Making the best of diversity 
A major feature of the G20 is its diversity. In this respect it is not just “a G7 with extra chairs” 
(Bénassy-Quéré et al, 2009). This dimension was overlooked in the urgency context of the first 
meetings but it is nevertheless of major relevance. It is graphically capture by Figure 10 where we 
plot the distribution of gross financial assets held cross-border and net savings international savings 
flows. The former are indicative of the degree of financial integration while the latter are indicative of 
the contributions to current account imbalances. Clearly, financial integration remains very much a 
G7 business (if anything, enlargement to Switzerland and the Netherlands should have been 
considered) whereas the G7 is largely inadequate to discuss global imbalances. 
In setting it agenda and goals, the G20 should make full use of the asset constituted by its diversity. 
The presence around the same table of advanced and developing economies, deficit and surplus 
countries, high and low savers, debtors and creditors, naturally leads to a possibility of exploiting 
complementarities, assuming cooperation works. Large creditors with vast pools of liquid reserves, 
like emerging Asians, can, for example, contribute to stabilise distressed debt markets in advanced 
countries. This would be in their own interest; in this way, they would contribute to mitigate risks of 
adverse feedbacks against their own export-oriented economies. 
                                                 
26 In a debate at the Brussels Forum on 26 March 2011.  
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Figure 10: Whose role? G7 vs. G20 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007), IMF WEO (2011), authors’ calculations. 
In its first three years of existence the G20 has attempted to strike a balance between the priorities 
of its advanced and emerging members but, in part because of the crisis, the former have played a 
more prominent role in setting the agenda. In 2008-2009 its agenda was dominated by the 
management of the global turmoil, the provision of financial resources to countries in crisis, and the 
rebuilding of financial regulation – a rather G7-like agenda. Furthermore, the framing of issues was 
strongly influenced by the nature of the problems in the advanced countries. As put by Andrew 
Sheng, rules for global finance were designed for Ferraris, not for Tatas27.    
The Korean presidency was in this respect a noteworthy moment as agenda shifted towards issues 
of importance for emerging and developing countries, such as global safety nets and development. 
The renewed focus on global imbalances also brings to the table an issue on which participation of 
major emerging economies is indispensable. But inflation, a major concern in that part of the world, 
remains of secondary importance in G20 discussions. More needs to be done to ensure that all G20 
members feel ownership in the organisation and it can be expected that the forthcoming Mexican 
and Russian presidencies will indeed reshape the agenda.  
5.5  Going forward 
In front of these challenges and given the considerable uncertainties, anyone should be reluctant in 
taking the risk of making explicit recommendations on how the G20 process should develop going 
forward, on how best to fulfil the promises of a 'global economic steering committee'. We would, 
however, miss an opportunity in this paper if we did not attempt, and perhaps shy away from our 
duty as observers. Our thoughts at this moment focus on two separate and only loosely connected 
areas. We feel there are, at the same time, a few simple and technical adjustments that could be 
made ('small fixes'), mainly of organisational nature. Alongside with them, there are much deeper 
                                                 
27 In remarks at the Bruegel-CEPII-ICRIER 2009 G20 conference, Delhi, September 2009.  
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areas of reflection that the G20 needs to undertake ('big hurdles') in a longer term horizon. The first 
could be decided and implemented, in principle, in a short time, even in a single meeting. The second 
are more fundamental. The challenge here is to develop the G20 mission, sharpening its common 
understanding and ownership of it, by developing an agreed set of share values (White, 2010). Let 
us comment briefly on both.  
The G20 is a quintessential intergovernmental organisation: participants (heads of state or 
government in this case) take part in it entrusted with their own powers, derived from the national 
political systems. The body itself is not delegated any authority: only the individual participants are. 
The chair, rotating annually (sometimes shared, as in 2010), bears sole responsibility for the agenda 
and the calendar of work, with the support of the two other members of the 'troika', composed by the 
rotating chairs of the preceding and the following year. Inevitably, the annual agendas have strong 
idiosyncratic components, reflecting national interests or philosophical biases. Work areas and 
deliverables each year are decided in essence by one country, while others are asked to patiently 
wait in line for their chance to make a mark.  
We believe the intergovernmental nature of the G20 is an asset to be preserved; attempts to enter 
the more technical sphere, invading eg the area that belongs to the IMF, should be resisted. 
Nonetheless, the exclusive reliance on the rotating chair for setting agendas is already proving to be 
a limitation to the effectiveness of the group. It is increasingly evident that this is a source of 
fragmentation and short-termism when the aim is to agree on and implement policy reform programs 
of a longer term nature. Strategic objectives cannot be agreed upon and dealt with within narrow 
yearly timeframes. The troika system does not fix this problem because 3 members out of 20 do not 
ensure a sufficient degree of representation. 
Limited improvements in working arrangements can help strengthen the continuity to the G20 
agenda. First of all, strategic directions should be discussed and agreed upon in specific sessions, 
freed from the constraints of the annual programs dictated by the rotating chair. Second, input from 
independent experts could help avoid agenda inertia and break path dependency, as suggested by 
Indian Sherpa Montek Singh Alhuwalia.28 Third and more ambitiously, a steering group (SG, similar to 
that set up in the FSB), with a mandate extending beyond the annual chair, could be foreseen. The SG 
would have responsibility to coordinate and bring together the output of working groups on specific 
areas, ensuring the unity of action of the G20 and its consistency over time. A SG would also 
contribute in ensuring a systematic liaison with the 'operational arms' (IMF, FSB, other standard 
setting bodies); the latter in principle should report to the G20, and are delegated tasks by it, but it is 
unrealistic to expect that the rotating chair alone can ensure the effective functioning of the the 
                                                 
28 In remarks at the Bruegel-CEPII-ICRIER 2010 G20 conference, Delhi, September 2010.  
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delegation structure. The SG should itself rotate in its composition, but in any given point in time 
should possess sufficient representation and members should remain in charge for a sufficiently 
long time to provide continuity (three years seems to be a minimum). 
Yet higher in terms of ambition would be the establishment of a permanent secretariat. Though the 
simple name often evokes ghosts of bureaucracy and red-tape, a small secretarial structure located 
at, and administratively dependent on, an existing institution (like the IMF) could act as an 
important catalyst and a source of stimulus. If the secretariat is kept small and with a narrow and 
well-focused mandate, such a reform could result in dramatically improving the efficiency of the 
process. It would make possible for countries in the group with less administrative capabilities and 
international experience to hold the chair and would prove to be a complement, not a 
counterbalance, to the prerogatives of the chair. Again, the precedent of the FSB, whose secretariat 
is hosted by the BIS in Basel, is useful references.  
This said, it is clear that organisational changes can never be a substitute for substance and vision. 
As it stands the G20 cannot provide such vision fundamentally because it lacks a shared philosophy, 
a common understanding of the economic priorities of our time and the way to approach them. A 
serious debate, though warranted and mature, has not started yet on a number of questions of 
central importance for the global economy. How will the global community cope with the limits to 
global resources in this century and beyond? How will the inescapable aspirations of economic 
newcomers (the emerging world) be made compatible with the requirements of the veterans, in a 
balance of interests that may benefit all? How can within- and between-countries inequalities 
generated by the globalisation process be tackled? How, in the political economy of this balance, 
should enter the interests of future generations? What economic system, specifically what position 
in the multifaceted spectrum between free and regulated markets, offers the best chance of making 
the reconciliation of this multidimensional set of interests easier? And, not least nor final, what are 
the specific orientations to be taken in the key areas facing the global economy going ahead – 
energy, environment, financial regulation, international monetary relations, crisis and natural 
disaster management, just to name a few? 
The need for a shared vision, or at least to start a dialogue, on these themes did not arise because of 
the G20; rather, it was the fruit of the same historical forces (globalisation and new equilibria in 
international relations) that gave rise to the G20. These are admittedly politicised and controversial 
issues, on which the risk of stalemate is significant. The G20 can and should respond to this 
challenge by helping develop this dialogue in the most harmonious possible way.  
 
 47
6. Conclusions: searching a script for the characters 
Our assessment of the first three years of the G20 is largely positive. Whereas other schemes for 
enlarging the G7 could have been considered – and could perhaps have been more appropriate – 
discussions on this point should not conceal the essential outcome, which is that this long-overdue 
enlargement was a major positive result of the crisis.  
The group earned political capital and built team spirit in the successful fight against the global 
recession in 2008-2009. Whereas later achievements were certainly less spectacular, they still 
compare favourably to the results of the G7/G8 over the previous decade. Size, which is admittedly a 
difficulty, and diversity have not prevented the G20 from being more effective than its more cohesive 
predecessor. Is this enough to claim success? Hardly. As we have argued, the G20 is facing three 
important challenges.  
The first is the challenge of legitimacy. The more the G20 proves effective, the more all countries in 
the world want to be represented in it. Why is Argentina a member, and not Chile? Why Turkey, and 
not Egypt? Why is most of Africa excluded? The more the group is hands-on, the more it raises 
questions about decision without representation. This is a hard challenge to address, because the 
G20 was born too large to evade it by pretending to confine itself to providing leadership. We have 
sympathy for the idea of forming constituencies, but we doubt this is a route that can be formally 
followed until its end. In the realm of immediate feasibility, we think that the G20 should as far as 
possible work through existing universal international organisations, so that decisions go through a 
formal process of deliberation and approval.  
The second is the challenge of effectiveness. We are afraid of diminishing returns. To address the 
problem, the G20 needs to equip itself with efficient working methods. We have made suggestions – 
a rotating steering group, a secretariat embedded in an existing international organisation. They can 
in principle be enacted quickly, but obstacles are in the details. We also believe that the G20 would 
gain effectiveness in limiting itself to the roles agenda-setter and compromise-builder, while leaving 
technicalities to specialised international organisations. This would help it staying ahead of the 
curve, instead of falling into the trap of path-dependency.    
The third is the challenge of vision. Until now the G20 has worked on the urgencies of the moment 
and those inherited from the past. This was fully justified at the time of the global crisis but is hardly 
sufficient in normal times. It now needs to make the best of its diversity to set itself a forward-
looking agenda.  
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As in Pirandello’s play – but hopefully, with less drama and despair – the right characters are there, 
but the plot is not written. Economic globalisation and the birth of global politics require the 
development of global political institutions. The G20 is the seed, but fulfilling its promises will require 
time.  
. 
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Appendix: scoring calculations using the University of Toronto G20 compliance reports29 
The average compliance scores, by summit and by topic, were constructed using the results of the 
compliance reports produced by the G-20 Research Group at the University of Toronto (see 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/index.html). It should be noted that the UoT results are based 
on samples: at each summit a limited number of commitments from the leaders’ declaration are 
chosen to be monitored, and the overall compliance is based only on them. On the selection of 
commitments, the latest report (Toronto Compliance Report) states that: 
 “The selection should be balanced and represent the summit priorities, be important 
for the G20 and the world, be comprehensive and cover most of the summit domains 
and decision areas, and represent both individual and collective pledges. The 
selected commitments should also meet secondary criteria relating to performance 
measurability, ability to comply within the monitoring period and the feasibility of 
establishing interpretative guidelines.” 
Most importantly, the reports keep up with the evolving list of issues raised during the successive 
summits and the number of commitments recorded in each iteration of the report is different. The 
Washington report features 230, the London report features 5, and 8 items are monitored in the 
reports for Pittsburgh and Toronto.  
Summit scores 
Following von Fürstenberg and Daniels (1992), the UoT analysts assign to each commitment a score 
of -1 (non compliance), 0 (partial compliance) or +1 (full compliance). Our summit scores were 
computed as simple averages of the scores assigned to each of the commitments monitored at each 
summit, regardless of their belonging to one of the four groups outlined below. For the Toronto report, 
where there are several macroeconomic commitments that do not apply to all countries, only one 
overall score if used for macroeconomic policies.  
Because of missing data for the Trade commitment, the score for the Washington summit is only 
available for 14 countries. 
  
                                                 
29 Prepared by Christophe Gouardo. 
30 In fact, there is no comprehensive compliance report available for Washington. We use the scores from two 
individual compliance reports focusing specifically on trade and financial regulation, and compute the 
summit score as the weighted average of these two issues. 
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Issue scores 
The scores for each of the four areas – Macroeconomic Policy, Financial Regulation, IFI Reform, and 
'Others' – are first computed for each of the areas, and then the average is calculated. The 
Macroeconomic Policy, Financial Regulation, IFI Reform and Others areas each appear at 3, 4, 2 and 4 
summits respectively. In practice each area is represented by a single item, except 'Others', which 
changes in perimeter depending on the issues discussed at each summit (broadly, the 'Others' 
category aggregates Trade, Development, Energy, Corruption, Climate Change, and Food and 
Agriculture). 
Because of the way the average scores are constructed (and especially the fact that not all 
commitments feature at each summit and that the total number of commitments, both at each 
summit and within each issue group, is different), the 'Average' columns at the end of the tables are 
not identical. 
Group averages 
The group averages are simply the averages of the scores obtained by individual countries at each 
summit/on each issue area. When weighted scores are calculated, the weights are on the basis of the 
country’s share of GDP at market prices in the year 2010 within each group. The weights for each 
the groups are presented below. The groups are as follows:  
- G-20 (20 countries): all 19 G-20 national countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States)  plus the European Union. 
- Advanced (9 countries): Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, UK, USA 
- Advanced in deficit (6 countries): Australia, Canada, France, Italy, UK, USA. 
- Emerging (11 countries): Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Turkey. 
- Emerging in deficit (6 countries): Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey. 
- G7 (7 countries): Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA. 
- G7 Europe (4 countries): France, Germany, Italy, UK. 
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Table A1: GDP weights used in calculations, at market prices in 2010 
 
Source: IMF WEO (2011). 
G20 Advanced Advanced
in deficit
Emerging Emerging
in deficit
G7 G7 Europe
Argentina 0.57% - - 2.53% - - -
Australia 1.90% 3.62% 5.07% - - - -
Brazil 3.21% - - 14.29% 36.25% - -
Canada 2.42% 4.61% 6.46% - - 4.94%
China 9.04% - - 40.18% - - -
France 3.97% 7.57% 10.60% - - 8.10% 25.32%
Germany 5.10% 9.71% - - - 10.40% 32.50%
India 2.36% - - 10.51% 26.67% - -
Indonesia 1.09% - - 4.83% - - -
Italy 3.16% 6.02% 8.44% - - 6.44% 20.15%
Japan 8.39% 15.99% - - - 17.12%
Korea 1.55% 2.95% - - - - -
Mexico 1.60% - - 7.10% 18.02% - -
Russia 2.25% - - 10.01% - - -
Saudi Arabia 0.68% - - 3.03% - - -
South Africa 0.55% - - 2.44% 6.20% - -
Turkey 1.14% - - 5.07% 12.86% - -
UK 3.46% 6.58% 9.23% - - 7.05% 22.03%
USA 22.53% 42.94% 60.19% - - 45.96% -
EU 25.03% - - - - - -
